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OPTIMAL INSURANCE BROKERAGE COMMISSION 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper studies a principal-agent insurance brokerage problem with a risk-averse 
principal (an insured) and a risk-neutral agent(a broker). The concept of “mean-preserving 
spread-reducing effort” is introduced to delineate the broker's activities. Using the first-order 
approach, it is shown that under some common conditions, the insured may “concavify” the 
reward function to induce the risk-neutral agent to exert MPSR brokering effort. Surprisingly, 
these conditions together with an additional condition guarantee the validity of the first-order 
approach even when the monotone likelihood ratio condition (used exclusively to justify the 
first-order approach) is violated. The case with a risk-averse agent is also considered. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In a seminal paper, Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) formulate a moral hazard model under 
which a risk-neutral principal (an insurance company) alleviates the adverse incentive 
problem of a risk-averse agent (an insured) by structuring the payoff (indemnity) function to 
affect the agent's action (self-protection activity). They derive first-order conditions for this 
principal-agent problem using the calculus of variation technique. Later, Mirrlees (1975, 
1999) points out that this first-order approach for solving principal-agent problems is often 
invalid. Grossman and Hart (1983) and Rogerson (1985) show that if the distribution of the 
risk faced by the principal satisfies both the monotone likelihood ratio condition (MLRC) and 
the convexity of distribution function condition (CDFC), the first-order approach is valid. 
Jewitt (1988) argues that the CDFC is unnatural.1He justifies the first-order approach by 
keeping the MLRC, substituting the CDFC with less restrictive conditions on the distribution 
function, and imposing a restriction on the agent's utility function. 
 
It is well-known (see, e.g., Whitt, 1980; Rogerson, 1985) that the MLRC implies that a 
rise in the agent's effort raises the principal's outcome in the sense of first-order stochastic 
dominance and necessarily raises the principal's average outcome. The MLRC, which is 
exclusively relied upon in justifying the first-order approach, is generally believed to be 
natural in production management problems and insurance moral hazard problems as a rise in 
a manager's effort is expected to raise the average profit of his company and a rise in an 
insured's self-protection effort is expected to reduce the average insured loss. Unfortunately, 
not all interesting agency problems satisfy the MLRC. Particularly, in an insurance brokerage 
problem, in which an insured (a principal) transfers his risk by purchasing insurance through 
a broker (an agent), the MLRC is violated.2 An insurance broker supposedly works on behalf 
of an insured to search for appropriate insurance products with sufficient coverage or to 
bargain with insurance companies to tailor-make new products with appropriate coverage. In 
the benchmark case where insurance is actuarially fair, a broker's search activities, though 
                                                 
1Besides being unnatural, the CDFC is often incompatible with MLRC since many distribution functions that 
satisfy the latter do not satisfy the former. LiCalzi and Spaeter (2003) exhibit two classes of distribution 
function that satisfy both the MLRC and the CDFC although these distributions are still restrictive. For a good 
summary of the first-order approach and its related problems, see Laffont and Martimort (2002). 
 
2The MLRC is also violated in some risk management problems. For example, a risk-averse exporter that 
has little or no knowledge in managing its foreign currency risk may rely on a risk management consultant, a 
bank, or an internal risk manager to perform professional hedging activities to reduce its foreign exchange rate 
risk. Such activities certainly do not increase the exporter's average outcome and hence do not satisfy the MLRC. 
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costly to the broker, preserve the mean outcome of an insured. At the same time, the spread 
of the risk distribution shrinks after the purchase of insurance. Therefore, the broker's 
activities can be called “mean-preserving, spread-reducing”(MPSR). It can be shown that 
such MPSR activities violate the MLRC such that the solution of an insurance brokerage 
problem derived using the first-order approach is no longer justified under Rogerson's (1985) 
or Jewitt's (1989) conditions. 
 
Besides the nature of agents' activities, the risk attitudes of principals and agents also 
distinguish insurance brokerage problems from traditional principal-agent problems that 
focus on risk-neutral principals and risk-averse agents (see, e.g., Spence and Zeckhauser, 
1971; Campbell and Kracraw, 1987; Oyer, 2000, etc.). In an insurance brokerage problem, an 
insured is often a small company (such as a small engineering consulting firm,a small audit 
firm, a sole proprietor company) or an individual who is risk-averse whereas a brokerage 
company often has a relatively large and diversified portfolio of clients and can thus be 
treated as risk-neutral.3 Clearly, a risk-neutral agent has no inherent incentive to exert costly 
effort to raise insurance coverage so as to reduce its principal's risk. It can be shown that a 
constant reward (commission) cannot induce a risk-neutral agent to exert an optimal level of 
MPSR effort to search for an optimal level of insurance coverage. More importantly, it is not 
clear whether the optimal reward function (commission schedule) under an insurance 
brokerage problem is or is not similar to those derived under traditional principal-agent 
problems. 
 
The following questions will be answered in this paper. (i) What are the characteristics of 
the optimal reward function of an insurance brokerage problem in which the principal is risk-
averse and the agent is risk-neutral and in which the agent's effort is MPSR? (ii) Under what 
conditions is the first-order approach justified under an insurance brokerage problem in 
which the MPSR condition is satisfied but the MLRC is violated? (iii) Can the above results 
still prevail when the agent becomes risk-averse (e.g., in an internal risk management 
problem in which the agent is a risk manager) and if not then what additional conditions are 
needed? 
 
                                                 
3According to Tommy (2000), the insurance brokerage market is dominated by several large brokers. Almost 
sixty percentage of global insurance has been brokered by the largest two insurance brokers, namely, MarshInc. 
and  Aon Corp.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 states the principal-agent insurance 
brokerage problem with a risk-averse principal and a risk-neutral agent. 
The solution of the model is derived using the first-order approach. A new concept called 
“mean-preserving spread-reducing effort” is then introduced. Section 3 discusses the 
incentive problem in insurance brokering. Section 4 characterizes the optimal reward function 
in the insurance brokerage problem. Section 5 derives the conditions that guarantee the 
validity of the first-order approach for solving the problem. Section 6 extends the results to 
the case in which both the principal and the agent are risk-averse. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. A PRINCIPAL-AGENT INSURANCE BROKERAGE MODEL 
 
A risk-averse principal (e.g., an individual or a small business) faces random outcome x~ , 
where x~  may be an insurable risk or a hedgeable risk. The principal hires a risk-neutral agent 
whose sole responsibility is to search for insurance or hedging instruments with appropriate 
coverage to reduce the risk. In the case of an insurable risk, the agent is a large insurance 
brokerage company. For convenience, therefore, this class of problems will be called 
“insurance brokerage problems” from now on. Assume x~  has realizations x, support [ ]xx,  , 
distribution function F, and density function [ ] [ ]1,0,: →ℜ× +xxf  with >),( axf  
[ ]xxx ,,0 ∈∀  and a∀ . Assume for simplicity that f  is twice continuously differentiable in a  
and that both af  and f are twice continuously differentiable in x . Here, 0≥a is agent’s 
effort with cost function c  satisfying ( ) ( ) 0lim,0 0 =′>⋅ → acc a , and ( ) 0>⋅′′c .4 A larger a  
means that a larger portion of risk x~  is transferred via a change in f  to be clarified later. 
Assume for simplicity that the principal is totally ignorant in risk management, and is thus 
incapable of observing a . This is particularly true in the property and liability insurance 
because the ultimate coverage received by the insured is often extremely complicated 
depending on a lot of factors, such as coinsurance rate, deductibles or excesses on different 
exposures, policy limits (e.g., per claim limits and aggregate limits), exclusions, 
endorsements, etc. 
                                                 
4These assumptions on the cost function of the agent's effort are standard in the literature. In the case of 
insurance brokerage, to increase coverage, an insurance broker has to dedicate more resources and effort to 
search amongst different insurance policies offered in the market and to bargain with insurers to raise indemnity 
rates, to lower deductibles, to delete exclusions, or to add endorsements to broaden the coverage under a 
standard policy. An alternative interpretation is that the insured has many small independent insurable risk units 
such that the agent's cost rises as a higher percentage of these risk units receives coverage. 
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The principal with utility function v satisfying 0>′v and 0<′′v chooses a and reward 
function s to maximize expected utility, that is, 
                                                  
}{
[ ]∫ −xxas dxaxfxsxv ),()(max(.),                                                  (1) 
subject to the risk-neutral agent’s incentive compatibility (IC)constraint given by  
                                         ( ) ( )∫ −∈ xx acdxaxfxsa )(,maxarg  .                                               (2) 
In other words, the principle, though incapable of observing a , selects a  via the agent’s 
incentive compatibility constraint using reward function s . Besides the IC constraints, the 
principle’s problem is also subject to the agent’s individual rationality (IR) constraint given 
by 
                                                 ∫ ≥−xx Racdxaxfxs ,)(),()(                                                      (3) 
where R  is agent’s reservation utility. 
 
According to the first-order approach introduced by Spence and Zeckhauser (1971), the IC 
constraint may be replaced by the first-order condition of the agent’s maximization problem 
(2), namely, 
                                                  ∫ =′−xx a acdxaxfxs .0)(),()(                                                   (4) 
The solution of the optimal control problem is given by:5 
                                                  [ ]
),(
),(
)(
axf
axfxsxv aµλ +=−′ ;                                                  (5) 
             [ ] 0)(),()(),()( =⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ′′−+−∫ ∫xx xx aaa acdxaxfxsdxaxfxsxv µ .             (6) 
                                                 
5 The Lagrangian function of the optimal control problem is given by  
).,(),(),()( axsfaxsfaxfsxvL a λµ ++−=  
The optimal control solution is given by 
0),(),(),()( =++−′−= axfaxfaxfsxv
ds
dL
a λµ  
which upon simplifying gives rise to(5). Static maximization by the choice of a  gives 
( )[ ] ( ) ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ′−+⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ′′−+− ∫∫∫ )(),()(),()(),( acdxaxfxsacdxaxfxsdxaxfxsxv xx axx aaaxx λµ  
    = ( )[ ] ( )⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ′′−+− ∫∫ xx aaaxx acdxaxfxsdxaxfxsxv ),()(),( µ  
   = 0. 
The first equality is due to (4). 
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Since Lagrange multipliersλ  and µ  are independent of x ,(5) can be used to solve for s as 
a function of x .6 
  
To characterize the optimal solution of the insurance brokerage problem, it is necessary to 
specify the nature of the agent's effort and hence the distribution function of x~ . Let us focus 
on risk transfer activities of an agent that is actuarially fair or unbiased. For the purchase of 
fair insurance, for example, a rise in the broker's effort raises coverage and hence reduces the 
spread of the risk without changing the mean loss of the insured. This suggests that 
distribution F  should satisfy the following condition: 
 
Definition    An agent's effort is said to be Mean-Preserving, Spreading-Reducing (MPSR) if 
adaF
x
x a∫ ∀< ,0),( θθ  and ),( xxx∈∀  and adaFxx a∫ ∀= ,0),( θθ .7  
 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) show that a risk-averse individual strictly prefers 
distribution G  to distribution F  if the latter represents a strict mean-preserving spread of the 
former (i.e.,for any a , [ ]∫ ∈∀>−xx xxxdaGaF ),(,0),(),( θθθ  with [ ]∫ −xx axGaxF ),(),(  
0=dx ). Let ),( aG θ ),,( aaF ∆+= θ for any fixed a .It can be checked that 
[ ] ,0),()),( <−∆+∫ θθθ daFaaFxx  ),( xxx∈∀ . Divide the left side by a∆ and take limit 
as a∆  tends to zero to get ∫ <xx a daF 0),( θθ . Similarly, [ ]∫ =−∆+xx daFaaF 0),()),( θθθ  
gives rise to ( )∫ =xx a aF )0,θ  A rise in MPSR effort a  clearly results in a mean-preserving, 
spread-reducing change in the distribution of .~x  
 
                                                 
6More correctly, s  is a function of x  and a .Argument a .does not play any role in the analysis that follows 
and is, therefore, suppressed for convenience following the common practice in the literature (see, e.g., Jewitt 
(1988)). 
 
7The MPSR concept can be modified slightly to become more general without affecting the conclusions in this 
paper. Particularly, one only needs to specify that adaF
x
x a∫ ∀≤ ,0),( θθ  and ),( xxx∈∀  with 
adaF
x
x a∫ ∀< ,0),( θθ  for some subjects of ),( xx  having positive measures, and ∫ =xx a daF .0),( θθ  
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It can be checked that if an insurance broker's effort is to raise the indemnity rate, to 
reduce the deductible, or to raise the policy limit of a fair insurance policy, distribution F  
satisfies the MPSR condition. To see this, let w be the initial wealth of the principal and y~  
be an insurable risk (with density function h  distribution function H , and support [ ]yy,  ) 
faced by the principal .The insurance broker exerts effort [ ]1,0∈a  to arrange for coinsurance-
type insurance with indemnity rate a .8 A similar argument applies to actuarially fair 
deductible-type insurance or insurance with a policy limit and is thus omitted. Now, the 
actuarially fair premium of the coinsurance-type insurance equals yaE~ , where E  is the 
expectation operator. The principal's random net worth, in the presence of broker-arranged 
insurance, equals 
)~()~~(~ xsyEyayw −−+− . 
Let )~~(~~ yEyaywx −+−= . The support of x~ can be written as 
[ ] [ ])~(),~(, yEyaywyEyaywxx −+−−+−= . The principal's net payoff is again equal to 
)~(~ xsx − . 
 
To see that the distribution of x~ satisfies the MPSR condition, it can be checked that  
∫ ∫ ∫
−
−−=== xx
y
y
y
a
yaExw dyyhdyyhaxfaxF
1
)()(),(),(  
such that when 1<a , 
                                 )
1
~
()~()1(),( 2
a
yaExwhyExwaaxFa −
−−⋅−−−−= − .                                (7) 
Now, 0),( =axFa . The right side of (7) changes from negative to positive (i.e., yExw ~( −−− ) 
changes from negative to positive) when x increases. This certainly implies that the MPSR 
condition is satisfied as ∫ <xx daFa 0),( θθ  for all ),( xxx∈  because ∫ =xx a dxaxF 0),( . The 
last equality is due to  
[ ]∫ −=−+−==xx yEwyEyaywExEdxaxxf ~)~~(~~),(  
regardless of the value of a such that 
∫ ∫∫ −=−=== xx xx aaxx aa dxaxFdxaxFaxFxdxaxxfdaxdE ),(),(),(),(
~
0 . 
 
                                                 
8In other words, it is assumed that it takes more effort to arrange for insurance with a higher indemnity rate. 
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3. THE INCENTIVE PROBLEM OF A RISK-NEUTRAL BROKER 
 
Can a state-independent reward that is commonly found in actual insurance brokering be 
optimal? From the previous section, it can be checked that any reward of the form 0)( sxs =  
for all [ ]xxx ,∈ where 0s is independent of x cannot be optimal. To see this, consider 
0)()(),()(),()(),()( 0 <′−=′−=′−=′−∫ ∫ acacaxFsacdxaxfsacdxaxfxs axx xx aoa  
as  0),( =axFa and 0'>c violating the agent's first-order condition (4). 
 
The next question is whether the solution derived in Section 2 can ever coincide with the 
first-best solution under perfect information. According to Wilson (1968) and Holmstrom 
(1979), when there is perfect information, the IC constraint is absent. Therefore, in the 
insurance brokerage problem, the Pareto optimal contract specifies reward function s such 
that  
                                                             [ ] λ=− )(' xsxv                                                             (8) 
when the principal can contract with the agent on effort a perfectly. Under this first-best 
contract, the principal's payoff )(xsx − is constant as 0<′′v . In other words, the principal will 
shift as much risk to the risk-neutral agent as possible provided that reservation utility R  is 
just met according to (3). 
 
It can be checked from (5) that under asymmetric information, the first-best solution given 
by (8) can be attained only if ff a /  is constant (i.e., )0)/( =xa ff for all a and for all 
[ ]xxx ,∈  because 0≠µ as will be shown in Lemma 1 to be presented in the next section. 
However, it can be checked that 0>a cannot be optimal to the agent when 0)/( =xa ff for 
all [ ]xxx ,∈ . To see this, suppose [ ]xxxff xa ,,0)/( ∈∀= . This implies that 
[ ]xxxMffa ,,/ ∈∀= , where M is a constant. It can be checked that 0=M . Suppose by 
contradiction that 0≠M . By taking expectation on both sides of Mffa =/ , it can be 
checked that ∫ ===≠ xx aa axFdxfM 0),(0 . A contradiction. Now, == M0  
[ ]xxxffa ,,/ ∈∀ , which in turn implies that ∫ =xx a dxaxfxs 0),()(  ,violating the agent's first-
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order condition (4) regardless of the shape of distribution F .This gives rise to the following 
result: 
 
Theorem 1   The first-best solution, 0/))(( =− dxxsxd , will never be achieved under the 
insurance brokerage problem in which the principal is risk-averse and the risk-neutral agent's 
effort a cannot be observed by the principal. 
 
Clearly, to induce the risk-neutral agent to exert any MPSR effort, the principal has to 
design reward function s  based solely upon observable realization x of x~ . Intuition suggests 
that the optimal reward function should create some spread in the agent's reward so that the 
agent will take the principal's risk attitude into account. The shape of the reward function is 
the subject of investigation of the next section. 
 
 
4. CHARACTERIZING THE OPTIMAL REWARD FUNCTION 
 
Before investigating the optimal reward function, it is necessary to first check that 
multipliers .λ  and µ  are strictly positive. Jewitt (1988) shows that when the principal is risk-
neutral, the agent is risk-averse, and the distribution satisfies MLRC, the multipliers are 
strictly positive. The following lemma states that his result can be extended to the insurance 
brokerage problem with a risk-averse principal and a risk-neutral agent:  
 
Lemma 1:   Suppose the agent's effort is MPSR. When the principal is risk-averse and the 
agent is risk-neutral, 0>λ and 0>µ  
 
Proof:    See Appendix. 
 
To compare the solution of the insurance brokerage problem with that of the traditional 
principal-agent problem, denote the reward function under the traditional problem with a 
risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent by t . It is well-known (see, e.g., Jewitt (1988)) 
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that Sgn [ ] =′ )(xt  Sgn [ ]xa ff )/( such that t  rises (c.f. falls) as ffa / rises (c.f. falls.)9 When 
ff a / is monotonically increasing satisfying the monotone likelihood ratio condition (to be 
defined formally in the next section), so is t . It is not clear whether this result                       
holds under the principal-agent insurance brokerage problem. 
 
Denote the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion for utility function v 
by vvAv ′′′−= / . v  is said to exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) if 0<′vA , 
non-increasing absolute risk aversion (NIARA) if 0≤′vA , and constant absolute risk 
aversion (CARA) if 0=′vA . NIARA is a generally accepted assumption because it is 
believed to be consistent with many reasonable economic behaviors (see, e.g., Arrow, 1963; 
Mossin, 1968).The following theorem states the relation between the principal's net payoff 
(i.e., )(xsx − ) and the ff a /  ratio, and the shape of reward function s : 
 
Theorem 2    Suppose the principal is risk-averse and the agent is risk-neutral. 
(a) )(1 xs′− and [ ]xa axfaxf ),(/),(  have opposite signs. 
(b) If v  exhibits NIARA and [ ] 0),(/),( <xxa axfaxf , then 0)( <′′ xs . 
 
Proof:    See Appendix. 
 
Theorem 2(a) suggests that the principal's optimal net return, )(xsx − , and the ff a / ratio 
move in opposite directions as x  increases whereas the agent's optimal reward )(xs  may rise 
or fall when ff a / rises. This result is obviously different from that of the traditional problem 
in which the risk-averse agent's optimal reward )(xt and ff a / move in the same direction. 
Theorem 2(b) suggests that reward function s is concave in x whenever ff a /  is concave in 
                                                 
9In the traditional problem with a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent, the principal maximizes 
expected payoff [ ]∫ −xx dxaxfxtx ),()( , instead of expected utility. The agent's expected payoff 
becomes [ ]∫ −xx acdxaxfxtu )(),()( , where u satisfies 0>′u  and 0<′′u . First-order condition 
(\ref{eq:laura04}) now becomes [ ] ),(
),(
)(
1
axf
axf
xtu
aµλ +=′  which upon differentiation on both sides of the 
equality gives Sgn [ ] =′ )(xt  Sgn [ ]xa ff )/( . 
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x  and the principal's utility function exhibits NIARA. Theorem 2(b) is intuitive. To induce 
the risk-neutral insurance broker to exert costly effort to search for appropriate insurance 
coverage to reduce the risk, the insured should concavify the broker's payoff function so that 
the broker will act as if it is risk-averse. It turns out that the conditions stated in Theorem 2(b) 
are also important for justifying the first-order approach for the insurance brokerage problem 
to be presented in the next section where it will be shown that 0<′′s  guarantees that the 
agent's expected payoff is concave in a . 
 
Figures 1 and 2 allow us to visualize the relations between reward function s , the 
ff a / ratio, and other related functions specified in Theorem 2. Here, it is assumed that 
),(@ xxx ∈ such that ),(,0)/( @xxxff xa ∈∀> and ),(,0)/( @ xxxff xa ∈∀< . 
 
[Please Insert Figure 1 and 2 Here!] 
 
Notice that it is well-known that if a distribution second-order stochastically dominates 
another distribution in Hadar and Russell’s (1969) terminology, then the two distribution 
functions satisfy the single-crossing property such that the density function of the first crosses 
that of the second twice, once from below and once from above. Since a mean-preserving 
reduction in spread between two distributions is a special case of second-order stochastic 
dominance, the double-crossing property of the density functions holds. This implies that the 
MPSR condition requires that af  (and hence ff a ) crosses the horizontal-axis twice, once 
from below and once from above as shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 also depicts a possible case 
in which the ( )ff a x function crosses the horizontal-axis once from above such that the 
slope of the principal’s payoff, 1 s′− , crosses the horizontal-axis once from below. In this 
particular case, the corresponding shapes of the principal’s net payoff function and the 
agent’s payoff function are depicts in Figure 2. 
 
 
 HKIBS/WPS/058-045 11
5. JUSTIFYING THE FIRST-ORDER APPROACH TO THE INSURANCE 
BROKERAGE PROBLEM 
 
The optimal solution of the insurance brokerage problem studied in this paper is derived 
using the “first-order approach” just like those of traditional principal-agent problems.10 
However, as pointed out by Mirrlees (1975), the first-order approach may not be valid in 
general. Rogerson (1985) shows that the first-order approach is valid for solving traditional 
principal-agent problems with risk-neutral principals and risk-averse agents if both of the 
following conditions are satisfied: 
 
Definition  An agent's effort is said to satisfy the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Condition 
(MLRC) if ( ) ],[,0 xxff xxa ∈∀≥  and ( ) 0>xa ff  for some subsets of ],[ xx  with 
positive measures.11 
 
Definition An agent's effort is said to satisfy the Convexity of Distribution Function 
Condition (CDFC) if ( ) 0, ≥axFaa  for all a  and all [ ]xxx ,∈ . 
 
 Jewitt (1988, p.1177) argues that “most of the distributions commonly occurring in 
statistics (and economics) do not have the CDF property.” He therefore maintains the MLRC 
but replaces the CDFC with some less restrictive conditions on the distribution function of 
the risk. At the same time, he restricts the class of utility functions that a risk-averse agent 
can take.12 On the other hand, the MLRC is generally believed to be natural and essential to 
                                                 
10 Araujo and Moreira (2001) show how the traditional principal-agent problem can be solved without using 
the first-order approach. 
11It can be shown using an argument similar to the one giving rise to Theorem 1 that ( ) [ ]xxxff xa ,,0 ∈∀=  cannot be optimal when the agent is risk-averse instead of risk-neutral. The 
literature seems to have omitted this by defining the MLRC as a condition under which the distribution only 
needs to satisfy ( ) [ ]xxxff xa ,,0 ∈∀=  (see, e.g., Rogerson (1986, p.1361)) and Jewitt (1989, condition 
2.11). 
12 Jewitt's (1988) Theorem 2 states that when the principal is risk-neutral and the agent is risk-averse, the 
first-order approach is valid if 
(a) ( ) θθ daFx
x∫ ,  is non-increasing and convex in a  for all x (Jewitt's (2.10a)); 
(b) ( ) θθ daFx
x∫ ,  is non-decreasing and concave in a  for all x (Jewitt's (2.10b)); 
(c) ( ) ( )axfaxfa ,,  is non-decreasing and concave in x  for all a (Jewitt's (2.11)); 
(d) ( ) ,0,0 >∀≤′′ zzω  where ( ) ( )( )zuuz 11−′=ω  (Jewitt's (2.12)). 
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the validity of the first-order approach.13 Unfortunately, whereas the MLRC is reasonable 
under share-cropping and some general moral hazard insurance models with a  being work 
effort and self-protection effort, respectively, it is not satisfied under the insurance brokerage 
problem. Particularly, one can show the following: 
 
Claim 2  The MPSR condition is incompatible with the MLRC. 
 
Proof:     See Appendix. 
 
 The question is whether the first-order approach can be justified under the principal-agent 
insurance brokerage problem in which the principal is risk-averse, the agent is risk-neutral, 
and the agent's effort is MPSR (violating the MLRC). The following theorem states the 
conditions under which the first-order approach is valid for the insurance brokerage problem: 
 
Theorem 3: Suppose the principal is risk-averse, the agent is risk-neutral, and the agent's 
effort is MPSR. The first-order approach is valid such that there exists 0>a  being optimal 
and being sustained by the agent's first-order condition if 
(a) ( ) θθ daFx
x∫ ,  is convex in a  for all x [ ]xx,∈ , 
(b) ( ) ( )[ ] 0,, <xxa axfaxf  for all a  and for all x [ ]xx,∈ , and 
(c) υ  exhibits NIARA. 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Theorem 3 presents a new set of conditions that justifies the first-order approach to 
principal-agent problems without utilizing either the MLRC or the ``unnatural'' CDFC. This 
new set of conditions is much simpler than that proposed by Jewitt (1988). Two main reasons 
why such simplification is possible are: (i) the replacement of risk-neutral principals/risk-
                                                 
13Jewitt (1988, p.1177) suggests that the MLRC has the “fairly natural interpretation of more effort, more 
output, and also serves to imply (when the first-order approach is valid) that the agent's payment is increasing in 
observed output. Sinclair-Desgagné (1994) justifies the first-order approach for the multi-signal principal-agent 
problem by maintaining the MLRC assumption. Brown et al.'s (1986) paper appears not to utilize the MLRC in 
part (i) of their theorem whereas the other three parts of their theorem all assume that the MLRC holds. Part (i) 
of Brown et al.'s (1986) theorem states that the first-order approach is valid when the risk-averse agent's utility 
is sufficiently concave. Unfortunately, it does not state concretely how concave the agent's utility function really 
needs to be. 
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averse agents by risk-averse principals/risk-neutral agents and (ii) the nature of MPSR 
activities giving rise to ( ) 0, =axFa . Notice that condition (a) of Theorem 3 has been used by 
Jewitt (1988, Theorem 2) and is believed to be less restrictive than the CDFC. Condition (c) 
is similar but less complicated than condition (2.12) of Jewitt's Theorem 2 (1988). It can be 
checked from footnote (12) that Jewitt's condition (2.12) essentially requires that the agent's 
utility function has a coefficient of absolute risk aversion that must not decrease too 
quickly.14  
 
The intuition of Theorem 3 becomes apparent when one compares it with Theorem 2. It 
should be recalled from part (b) of Theorem 2 that conditions (b) and (c) of Theorem 3 imply 
that reward function s  is concave. The concavity of s  in x  renders the agent's expected 
payoff concave in a as shown in the proof of Theorem 3. With the now concave expected 
payoff, the risk-neutral agent is induced to choose an optimal level of positive MPSR effort 
as if he is risk-averse (or the agent is simply forced to take account of the risk-averse attitude 
of the principal as a result of the concave reward function). Notice from the proof of Theorem 
3 (particularly, equation (23)) that a linear reward function cannot be optimal because 0>a  
cannot be sustained by the agent’s first-order condition when 0=′′s . 
 
 
6. RISK-AVERSE RISK MANAGERS AND  
INTERNAL RISK MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS 
 
Instead of hiring a large and hence risk-neutral insurance broker to search for appropriate 
insurance coverage, a risk-averse principal can rely on a small insurance brokerage company 
or an internal risk manager to handle the matter. In either case, the agent may be risk-averse. 
                                                 
14According to Jewitt (1988), ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] 00 2 ≥′′′−⇔≤′′ dzzuzudzω . Further computation reveals 
that the latter condition is equivalent to ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) 020 ≥−⇔≥+′ zPzAzAzAzA uuuuu , where ( ) ( ) ( )zuzuzPu ′′′′′−=  is the coefficient of absolute prudence in Kimball's (1990) terminology. The last 
inequality holds only if ( )zAu does not decrease too quickly. Jewitt (1988, p.1181) also suggests that this 
is equivalent to a coefficient of relative risk aversion that is nondecreasing and bounded above by one half. 
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Denote a risk-averse agent's utility function by u  with 0>′u  and 0<′′u . Following the 
common practice, assume that the agent's expected utility is additively separable given by:15 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )acdxaxfxsux
x
−∫ ,  
such that the agent’s first-order condition (4) becomes 
( )[ ] ( ) 0)(, =′−∫ acdxaxfxsu axx                                           (9) 
and the principal’s first-order condition (5) becomes 
                                                     ( )[ ]( )[ ]
( )
( ) .,
,
axf
axf
xsu
xsx aµλυ +=′
−′                                              (10) 
 Since 0>µ  is no longer guaranteed when both the principal and the agent are risk-averse, 
assume for simplicity that 0>µ . The following states a theorem analogous to Theorems 2 
and 3: 
 
Theorem 4 Suppose both the principal and the agent are risk-averse with CARA utility 
functions (i.e., υυ AA =  and uu AA = where υA and uA are constants). 
(a) Sgn =
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −′⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +
1s
A
AA u
υ
υ Sgn ( )[ ]xa ff . 
(b) If ( ) ( )[ ] 0,, <xxa axfaxf , then ( ) 0<′′ xs . 
(c) If, in addition to the above conditions, ( ) θθ daFx
x
,∫  is convex in a  for all [ ]xxx ,∈ , then 
the first-order approach is valid with 0>a  being sustained by the agent’s first-order 
conditions. 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
 It should be apparent from Theorem 4 that allowing the agent to be risk-averse makes the 
insurance brokerage problem more complicated. In particular, to yield results similar to those 
stated in Theorems 2 and 3, one may need to impose restrictions (such as CARA) on the 
utility functions of both the principal and the agent. Notice that similar to the case with a risk-
neutral agent, a state-independent reward cannot be optimal (as stated in Theorem 1). 
However, a linear reward function can now be optimal, because 0>a  can be sustained by 
                                                 
15Alvi (1997) solves the traditional principal-agent problem without assuming additively separable utility on 
s  and c . 
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the agent’s first-order conditions given 0<′′u even when 0=′′s . Both results can be inferred 
easily from the Proof of Theorem 4 (particularly, equation (29)). 
 
Theorem 4 can be applied to a general principal-agent risk management problem. For 
example, the principal may be a risk-averse exporting company that hires a risk-averse risk 
manager who is responsible solely for transferring its exchange rate risk by hedging via the 
forwards market. Assume for simplicity that the company faces random exchange rate e~  with 
support [ ]ee, , density function [ ] +ℜ→eeg ,: , and distribution functionG . The principal's net 
worth is given by ( )qeEeaqex ~~~~ −−+= ω , where w  again represents initial wealth, q  is the 
total value of exports denominated in a foreign currency, and a  is the percentage of the 
exchange rate risk hedged by the agent. The support of x~  is given 
by ( ) ( )[ ]qeEeaqeqeEeaqe ~,~ −−+−−+ ωω .  
Consider 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )∫∫ ∫ −−−=== qa eaqEwxexx ee dagdagaxfaxF 1 ,,,, ξξξξ  
such that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ⋅⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−−⋅−−⋅−= −−
qa
eaqEwxgeqEwxaqaxFa 1
~~1, 21                       (11) 
It can be checked that eqEwxE ~~ += regardless of a  so that ( ) 0, =∫xx a dxaxF . Now, the right 
side of (11) changes from negative to positive as x  increases. Therefore, 
( ) ( )∫ ∈∀<xx a xxxdaF ,,0, θθ . The MPSR condition is again satisfied such that Theorem 4 
applies.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has analyzed the principal-agent insurance brokerage problem by introducing 
the concept of ``mean-preserving spread-reducing'' (MPSR) effort. It has been shown that 
when the principal's utility exhibits NIARA, the concavity of the ff a  ratio implies that the 
optimal reward function is concave. The concavity of the reward function induces the risk-
neutral agent to exert MPSR effort. Surprisingly, these conditions together with an additional 
condition on the distribution function of the risk (similar but simpler than those imposed by 
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Jewitt (1988)) guarantee the validity of the first-order approach, without using either the 
MLRC or the CDFC. Similar results can be obtained for the case in which both the principal 
and the agent are risk-averse (e.g., in an internal risk management problem) if the CARA 
utility restriction is imposed. 
  
In reality, however, a reward function that is concave in the realized value of x~  as 
predicted in Theorem 2 is seldom observed in insurance brokering. There are several possible 
explanations. First, the insurance brokering market is often subject to some degree of market 
imperfection as a result of market concentration and the expertise possessed by certain 
brokers (see, e.g., Tommy (2000)). Moreover, insureds may not have sufficient bargaining 
power so that brokerage commissions may be set by relatively large insurance brokers. 
Second, the insurance brokerage problem is often complicated by the moral hazard problem 
of a principal who can affect the loss distribution and hence the actual reward to be made to a 
broker under any pre-determined reward function. Third, besides purchasing insurance for its 
principal, a broker may provide other tied-in risk-management services, such as risk analysis, 
claim settlement, and provision of legal advice. In general, it is difficult to separate the 
reward made solely to insurance purchase and that made to other services. 
 
After all, the commissions received by brokers are often not transparent. The Risk and 
Insurance Management Society Inc. in New York has reportedly urged that the fees 
(including the contingent commissions offered by insurers) received by brokers be disclosed 
if requested by policyholders (see Tommy (2000)). Recently, there have been allegations of 
insurance brokers' misconduct for possibly receiving non-disclosed incentive fees from 
insurers. It is obvious that insureds should be reminded to beware of any potential conflict of 
interest with insurance brokers. Moreover, they should also be better informed of the 
possibility of concavifying their state-contingent commissions to be made to insurance 
brokers (e.g., by requiring insurance brokers to share their losses) in order to give them 
proper incentives to search for optimal insurance coverage. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: Integrating both sides of (5) and using the fact that ( ) 0, =axFa  
(as ( ) aaxF ∀= ,1, ) gives 
( )( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,,, ===−−′∫ ∫ axFaxfdxaxfxsx axx xx a µµλν  
                      ⇔  ( )( ) ( ) .0, >−′= ∫ dxaxfxsxxx νλ                                                                  (12) 
  Next, it will first be shown that 0≠µ . Suppose by contradiction that 0=µ . Then (5) 
implies that ( )( ) λν =−′ xsx  such that ( ) Kxxs −= as ( ) 0<⋅′′ν , where K  is a constant. The 
last equality implies that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,, <′−=′−−=′− ∫∫ acacdxaxfKxacdxaxfxs xx axx a                     (13) 
The second equality in (13) is because of ( ) ( ) 0,, == ∫∫ xx axx a dxaxFdxaxxf  and ( ) 0, =axFa . 
The inequality in (13) contradicts (4). Therefore, 0≠µ . With 0≠µ , (5) can be written as       
( ) ( )( ) ( ).,, axfxsxaxfa ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−′= µ
λν                                               (14) 
To check that 0>µ , suppose by contradiction that 0<µ . Now, using the fact 
that ( ) 0, =∫xx a dxaxxf , one can rewrite the agent’s first-order condition (4) as 
         0 = ( )[ ] ( ) ( )acdxaxfxsxx
x a
′+−∫ ,  
            = ( )[ ] ( )( )[ ] ( ) ( )acdxaxfxsxxsxx
x
′+−−′−∫− ,1 λνµ  
            = ( )[ ] ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )acdxaxfdyayfxsxxsxx
x
x
x
′+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ′−−′−∫ ∫− ,,1 ννµ  
            = ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )acxsxxsx ′+−′−− νµ ,~cov1  
            > 0                                                                                                                               (15) 
The second equality in (15) is due to (14). The third equality is due to (12). The last 
inequality is because of 0,0 <>′ µc , and the fact that a rise in ( )xsx −  coincides with a fall 
in ( )( )xsx −′ν as 0<′′ν such that ( ) ( )( )[ ] 0,cov <−′− xsxxsx ν . The last inequality in (15) 
gives rise to a contradiction! Therefore, 0>µ . □ 
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Proof of Theorem 2: To prove part (a), differentiate both sides of (5) with respect to x  to 
get 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ⋅⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=′−−′′
x
a
axf
axfxsxsx
,
,
1 µν                                           (16) 
According to Lemma 1, 0>µ . Substitute this and 0<′′ν  into (16) to get 
Sgn ( )[ ] −=′− xs1 Sgn ( )[ ]xa ff  
To prove part (b), rewrite (16) as 
( ) ( )( ) x
a
axf
axfsA ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=′−′⋅
,
,
1 µνν  
and differentiate both sides with respect to x  to get 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) xx
a
axf
axfsAsAsA ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=′′−′−′′′+′−′′−
,
,
11 22 µννν ννν                           (17) 
According to (17), 0<′′s  if and only if 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ⋅⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡>′′−′−′−′′−
xx
a
axf
axfsAsA
,
,
11 22 µνν νν                                (18) 
The inequality in (18) is clearly satisfies given 0<′′ν , 0>νA , 0<′νA  
and ( ) ( )[ ] 0,, <xxa axfaxf . □ 
 
Proof of Claim 2: Suppose the MLRC is satisfied such that ( ) [ ]xxxff xa ,,0 ∈∀≥  with 
( ) 0>xa ff for some subsets of [ ]xx,  with positive measures. Consider 
( ) ( )∫== xx aa dxaxfaxF ,,0                                                (19) 
implying that ff a  must changes sign on ( )xx,  at least once. This together with MLRC 
implies that ff a  must change sign exactly once. Therefore, there exists ( )xxx ,0 ∈  at 
which 0=ff a  such that ( )0,,0 xxff xa ∈∀< and ( )xxff xa ,,0 0∈∀> . The first 
inequality implies that ( ) ( )0,,0, xxaxF xa ∈∀< . 
 Next, consider any ( )xxx ,03 ∈ . Rewrite (19) as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )fdxfffdxfffdxffaxF x
x a
x
x a
x
x aa ∫∫∫ ++== 3300,0 .             (20) 
 HKIBS/WPS/058-045 19
Now, ( )xxff xa ,,0 0∈∀>  implies that ( ) 0
3
>∫ fdxffxx a  and hence 
( ) ( ) 0, 33 <= ∫ fdxffaxF xx aa  according to (20). Since 3x can be chosen arbitrarily close to x , 
one has ( ) ( )xxaxF xa ,,0, 0∈∀< . This together with ( ) ( )0,,0, xxaxF xa ∈∀< implies that 
( ) ( )xxdaF xxx a ,,0, 0∈∀<∫ θθ  violating the MPSR condition at xx =  . Therefore, MLRC 
implies not MPSR and vice versa. □ 
 
Proof of Theorem 3:  As suggested by Jewitt (1988), to show that the first-order approach of 
principal-agent problems is valid, it suffices to show that the agent's second-order condition 
holds. It can be checked that the agent's second-order condition is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0, <′′−∫xx aa acdxaxfxs .                          (21) 
  
Integrating the first term on the left side of (21) by parts twice gives 
                           ( ) ( )∫xx aa dxaxfxs ,  
         = ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) dxxafxsdxaxfxs x
x
x
x aa
x
x aa ∫ ∫∫ ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡′− θθ ,,  
         = ( ) ( ) dxdafxsx
x
x
x aa∫ ∫ ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡′− θθ ,  
         = ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) dxdaFxsdxaxFxs x
x
x
x aa
x
x aa ∫ ∫∫ ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡′′+− θθ ,, . 
         = ( ) ( ) dxdaFxsx
x
x
x aa∫ ∫ ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡′′ θθ ,                                                                        (22) 
The second equality in (22) is because of ( ) ( ) ( )( )0,0,, ===∫ axFasaxFdxaxf axx aaaa . The 
fourth equality is because of ( ) ( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ ∀== ∫∫ axx axx aa dxaxFasdxaxF ,0,0, . Now, conditions (b) 
and (c) imply that 0<′′s  according to Theorem 2. This together with 
( ) ( )xxdaF xxx aa ,,0, ∈∀>∫ θθ  clearly implies that the right side of the last equality of (22) is 
negative. Therefore, (21) holds as 0>′′c . 
 HKIBS/WPS/058-045 20
Next, it can be checked that 0>a  can be sustained by the agent's first-order condition 
when effort a satisfies the MPSR condition. Replacing aaf and aaF  by af  and aF in (22) and 
using the fact that ( ) 0, =axFa  and ( )∫ =xx a dxaxF 0,  gives 
                             ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) dxdaFxsdxaxfxs x
x
x
x a
x
x a ∫ ∫∫ ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡′′= θθ ,, .                (23) 
( ) 0, <∫ θθ daFxx a  for all a and all ( )xxx ,∈  together with 0<′′s  implies that the right side of 
(23) is strictly positive. This together with and 0>′′c and ( ) 0lim 0 =′→ aca implies that there 
exists 0>a  such that the agent's first-order condition (4) holds. 
 
Proof of Theorem 4:  Differentiating both sides of (10) with respect to x  gives 
          ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=′′
′′′−′−′
′′=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
′
′
f
fs
u
vus
u
v
u
v aµ21  
         ( )
x
x
a
uv f
fs
u
vAs
u
vA ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=′⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
′
′+′−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
′
′−⇔ µ1  
                           
( ) ( )
v
xa
v
uv
A
vuff
s
A
AA ′′=−′⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +⇔ µ1 .                                                 (24) 
Suppose vv AA =  and uu AA = . Then given ,0,0,0 >>> uv AAµ  and ( ) 0>′′ vu , it can be 
checked that (24) implies that 
     ( )[ ]xa
v
uv ffSgns
A
AASgn =
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −′⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +
1 .   
 
Differentiating the first line of (24) with respect to x  gives                        
                    ( ) ( ) s
u
vAs
u
vA
u
vsA vvv ′′⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
′
′+−′
′
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
′
′+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
′
′−′′− 11 2             
                                   
xx
a
uuv f
fs
u
vAs
u
vA
u
vsA ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=′′⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
′
′+′
′
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
′
′+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
′
′′′+ µ2 .                          (25) 
Substituting the first line oaf (24) into (25) and rearranging yields 
  ( ) ( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
′
′
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
′
′′′−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
′
′−′′+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=′′⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
′
′+
v
u
f
f
u
vsA
u
vsA
f
f
s
u
vAA
x
a
uv
xx
a
vu
2
221 µµ .                  (26) 
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Substituting vvuu AAAA == , , and 0=′=′ uv AA  into (26) gives 
                   ( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ ′′⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=′′⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
′
′+
v
u
f
f
f
fs
u
vAA
x
a
xx
a
uv
2
µµ                                              (27) 
such that ( ) 0<xxa ff as 0>µ  and 0>′′ vu  imply that 0<′′s . 
 
To prove part (c), substitute ( )xs in (21) by ( )[ ]xsu  and integrate the new second-order 
condition by parts twice to obtain 
       [ ( )] ( ) ( )∫ ′′−xx aa acdxaxfxsu ,   
  =  ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∫ ∫ ∫ ′′−⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡⋅′⋅′−xx xx xx aaaa acdxxafsudxaxfxsxsu θθ ,,  
  =  ( ) ( )acdxdafsux
x
x
x aa
′′−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡⋅′⋅′− ∫ ∫ θθ ,  
  =  ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∫ ∫ ∫ ′′−⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡′′′+′′′+′′− xx xx xx aaaa acdxxaFsusudxaxFxsxsu θθ ,, 2  
  <   0                                                                                                                                 (28) 
The second equality is because of ( ) 0, =axFaa (as ( ) 0, =axFa ). The last inequality is because 
of ( ) ( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ ∀== ∫∫ axx axx aa dxaxFasdxaxF ,0,0, , 0<′′s , 0<′′u , ( ) ( )xxdaF xxx aa ,,0, ∈∀>∫ θθ , 
and 0<′′c . 
 
Next, it can be checked that (23) in the proof of Theorem 3 now becomes 
                ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) dxdaFsusudxaxfxsu x
x
x
x a
x
x a ∫ ∫∫ ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡′′′+′′′= θθ ,, 2 .                                  (29) 
( )∫ <xx a daF 0, θθ  for all a and all ( )xxx ,∈  together with 0<′′u  and 0<′′s  implies that the 
right side of (29) is strictly positive. This together with 0>′′c  and ( ) 0lim 0 =′→ aca  implies 
that there exists 0>a such that the agent's first-order condition (9) holds. □ 
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